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Abstract  
 
In this paper, we explore how managing actors’ boundary judgments influence the 
adaptability of water governance. We approach this question by examining the 
relationship between the way water managers frame, and act in, complex water issues on 
the one hand and develop adaptive water governance strategies on the other. We define 
four categories of boundary judgments made by water managers in order to deal with the 
complexities in water governance issues. An in-depth case study analysis of an attempt to 
adjust the management of the water regime in the south-west Delta of the Netherlands is 
provided in order to reconstruct the water managers’ boundary judgments and their 
impact upon governance strategies used. We found that, most of the time, the water 
managers involved predominantly made tight boundary judgments. These tight boundary 
judgments seemed to hamper the mutual learning process among a variety of stakeholders 
that is needed to realize adaptive water governance. We argue that wide boundary 
judgments enhance the chance of realizing adaptive practices and build upon exploration, 
learning, and connection.   
 
Keywords: adaptive water governance; boundary judgments; complex water issues; 
complexity management 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Management of complex water issues is highly challenging, as managers have to deal 
with both the unpredictability of ecosystems and the complexity of social systems 
(Huitema et al. 2009). Furthermore, water issues often cross different kinds of 
boundaries, such as physical and geographical boundaries (e.g. surface and ground 
water), different administrative and institutional boundaries (e.g. governmental levels and 
sectors), and social boundaries (e.g. between social and economic groups) (Mostert et al. 
2008). In the literature on water management, it is therefore stated that actors have to use 
adaptive strategies to deal with both the uncertainty of ecosystem dynamics and the social 
system’s complexity (Olsson et al. 2006). Accepting unpredictability, adaptive 
governance emphasizes learning and flexibility (Foxon et al. 2009).  
However, many questions still remain about why certain water governance 
systems are able to bring such approaches into practice, whereas others are not (e.g. 
Mostert et al. 2008; Olsson et al. 2006). Reflecting on the realization of adaptive water 
governance in practice, Pahl-Wostl et al. (2011) note that there is a lacuna in the 
translation of political rhetoric into change at the operational level. Moreover, Huitema et 
al. (2009) make the case that “despite its obvious attractiveness as an idea, [adaptive (co-
)management] is very hard to introduce and sustain in practice”. It seems difficult to 
implement or manage a transition towards adaptive water governance. The literature on 
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adaptive governance, addressing the political dimension, pays attention to institutional 
factors, power relationships, and process conditions in this matter (e.g. Folke et al. 2005; 
Huitema et al. 2009; Olsson et al. 2006). As changes in water system management 
regimes touch upon the interests of many actors, this literature shows that, for adaptive 
water governance, public participation, social learning, and knowledge building among a 
variety of involved stakeholders are important; thus also addressing questions of 
legitimacy. This emphasizes both the importance, and the fragility and political character 
of actors’ cross-boundary interaction (Mostert et al. 2008; Edelenbos and Teisman 2011).  
Less attention is paid to the way water managers demarcate the complex social-
ecological system with which they deal and how they interpret the relevance and impact 
of the interdependencies they encounter. This is an important aspect to consider, as it 
influence the process of cross-boundary interaction that emerges in practice (cf. Mostert 
et al. 2008; Pel and Boons 2010; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2011). In this paper, we elaborate such 
an analysis with the help of the concept of boundary judgments. This concept emphasizes 
the unavoidable need and act of actors to draw boundaries around their system of action. 
It focuses on the way in which actors cope with the complexities of everyday reality by 
demarcating and making sense of their surroundings (Luhmann 1995). We approach 
adaptive governance as the way actors respond to dynamics and complexity regarding 
social-ecological issues (cf. Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007). We focus on the governance process 
and how managing actors deal in an adaptive way with the dynamics resulting from the 
unpredictability and complexity of social-ecological systems. The “adaptive” part of the 
concept recognizes that water management is a complex system that changes over time, 
such that policies must adjust to new information and insights about dynamic social and 
ecological processes (Medema 2008). 
In the next two sections, we elaborate the concept of boundary judgments. We 
then use the resulting analytical framework to analyze a case in which water managers 
tried to change the existing water governance regime in order to give ecological values 
more weight. However, during the implementation they are confronted with several 
difficulties, and after more than 20 years a new water governance regime has still not 
been realized.  
 
 
2 Theoretical framework: boundary judgments and adaptive water governance 
 
2.1 Boundary judgments: coping with complexity 
 
The concept of boundary judgments has been developed within critical system thinking, 
and it refers to the assumptions about what should belong to the system in question and 
what should belong to its environment (Ulrich 1987). As Pel and Boons (2010: 1251) put 
it: “Behind any apparently self-evident identification of systems there is judgment, and to 
be critical means to account for these constitutive ‘boundary judgments’.” According to 
Luhmann (1995), drawing boundaries is a way of coping with the complexity of everyday 
reality, and through these boundary judgments actors are able to make sense of their 
surroundings. Boundary judgments determine “what is in view and might be taken into 
account at the moment and what is out of view and thus excluded from consideration” 
(Flood 1999: 92). 
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Actors make boundary judgments in order to cope with the complexities in their 
surroundings, by demarcating what is included or excluded. In the literature on 
management within complex systems, a distinction is made between complexity reducing 
behavior versus complexity embracing behavior (Ashmos et al. 2000; Teisman 2005; 
Uhl-Bien et al. 2007; Edelenbos et al. 2012). Tight (or exclusive) boundary judgments 
focus on reducing or controlling complexity, whereby complexity is decomposed in 
isolated parts, and problems in those parts are first resolved in isolation and subsequently 
integrated with other problem fields (Axelrod and Cohen 1999). It “…helps a manager to 
restrict his/her actions and attentions to a […] system that can be known and controlled 
better” (Boons et al. 2009: 248). This means that internal or external dynamics of 
governance processes should be avoided, because it leads away from initially designed 
solutions. However, water issues cross all kinds of system boundaries, and tight boundary 
judgments could prevent the learning and joint knowledge building needed among a 
variety of actors, as emphasized in the literature on adaptive governance.  
Wide (or inclusive) boundary judgments start from a more holistic system 
approach (Holling et al. 1998) in which the cross-cutting characteristics of complex water 
issues are taken as the point of departure. Water managers with wide boundary judgments 
focus on the interdependencies of issues, actors, processes, and structures. This means 
that managers are oriented towards making meaningful connections (Edelenbos et al. 
2012). This could lead to more inclusive water governance processes “…where ambitions 
and actions can be combined and consensus between possible diverging strategies more 
easily realized” (Boons et al. 2009: 248).  
In order to analyze the boundary judgments of water managers in a systematic 
way, we have developed an analytical framework in which we distinguish four categories 
of boundary judgments relating to different dimensions of complexity faced by water 
managers (table 1). 
 
2.2 Four categories of boundary judgments 
 
In dealing with complex water issues, water managers have to make boundary judgments 
with respect to the substance of the issue at question. Which kinds of aspects and 
domains are involved? These demarcations could be typified as substantive boundary 
judgments. The choice of values that are considered relevant is important for these 
boundary judgments. For example, is the specific water issue about realizing ecological 
sustainability or about economic vitality, or both? Within political processes, substantive 
boundary judgments are often made explicitly when decisions are made concerning the 
priority of policy programs and related values; but technical experts examining water 
issues also make substantive boundary judgments, whether implicit or explicit (e.g. 
Dewulf et al. 2005; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).  
A second dimension stems from the emergent dynamics during the governance 
process, resulting from interaction between involved actors (e.g. Ashmos et al. 2000; 
Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). The way in which stakeholders are involved (the width and 
depth of participation) influences the governance process (e.g. Edelenbos and Klijn 2006; 
Raadgever et al. 2008). Water managers make participation boundary judgments 
regarding the involvement of different actors at different junctures (cf. Ashmos et al. 
2000). Hence, these judgments are about actors’ inclusion in, and exclusion from, the 
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governance process and the depth of participation, influencing the specific interaction 
patterns emerging during the governance process. 
Although involved stakeholders may come to consensus about the substantive 
issue at stake, designing and implementing policy measures is certainly not 
straightforward. A third dimension of complexity in this respect stems from the 
institutional fragmentation of the water governance system. Especially in more 
polycentric governance systems (Huitema et al. 2009), this structural complexity is 
relatively large (cf. Ashmos et al. 2000) as a result of the increasing specialization and 
fragmentation of the responsibilities concerning water among different organizations and 
sectors (Edelenbos and Teisman 2011). Furthermore, the cross-cutting characteristic of 
water issues, including different jurisdictions and institutional domains or sectors, 
enhances this structural complexity. It often means that cooperation and coordination 
among a variety of governmental agencies is necessary to realize policy measures. This is 
challenging, as every pillar often has the tendency to defend its own interest (Edelenbos 
and Teisman 2011). Regarding this structural complexity, actors make structural 
boundary judgments. Water managers have to make choices about how to organize their 
activities. These are demarcations regarding the structure of governance processes: 
demarcations of different phases and elements of a policy process, how these different 
parts are connected, and which agents are responsible for each part.  
These three different dimensions of complexity are oriented towards the internal 
dynamics within the specific governance process, resulting from the evolution of 
interpretations, actions, and interactions of involved actors. As complex water issues 
cross different geographical borders and governance levels, dynamics could also occur in 
the environment of the project. These external dynamics constitute a fourth dimension of 
complexity. An example of these external dynamics are so-called change events (e.g. De 
Bruijn et al. 2002; Teisman et al. 2009), such as abrupt political developments (e.g. 
changing coalitions), new knowledge concerning climate conditions, or changing 
conditions of another, but influencing (water) system. These external events could change 
the scope of the issue or the position of the issue on the policy agenda (Kingdon 1984). 
Boundary judgments regarding these external dynamics could be typified as contextual 
boundary judgments. Water managers can differ in their (implicit) orientation and 
behavior to include or exclude developments in the surroundings or context of their 
project.  
 
---------------Insert Table 1 around here------------------------------------------- 
 
We stress that in reality these four categories are related. For example, participation 
boundary judgments also influence the values that are being considered, thereby 
influencing substantive boundary judgments. In our analysis, we also pay explicit 
attention to these interrelationships. In order to analyze the boundary judgments of water 
managers in our case study, we need to further conceptualize and operationalize the four 
categories of boundary judgments.  
 
 
3 Operationalization and research methodology  
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3.1 Operationalization 
 
On the basis of the distinction between the different categories of boundary judgments, 
we analyze the case by focusing on the following specific demarcations that actors make. 
We use a five point scale (from -- to ++) to indicate the tightness or wideness of the 
boundary judgments:  
 To analyze the substantive boundary judgments, we examine the domain 
demarcations indicating the extent to which different values are included in the 
project. Tight substantive boundary judgments are made when the project is 
(mainly) approached and developed from one functional domain, for example 
water quality. Wide boundary judgments are made when different domains play a 
significant role in formulating measures; 
 To analyze the participation boundary judgments, we examine the demarcations 
with regard to the actors involved. Tight participation boundary judgments are 
made when relatively few stakeholders in the policy process are (actively) 
involved and many are (implicitly) excluded. Wide boundary judgments are made 
when relatively many stakeholders are actively involved in the policy process; 
 To analyze the structural boundary judgments, we examine the demarcations with 
regard to the different parts of policy processes (e.g. policy development and 
implementation) and the coordination of actors’ responsibilities to act on these 
parts. Tight structural boundary judgments are applied when the project is divided 
into clearly separated parts by strictly defined responsibilities. Wide boundary 
judgments are made when parts of the project and related projects are approached 
as interacting and co-evolving; 
 To analyze the contextual boundary judgments, we examine the way the 
responsible actors relate the project to its environment. Tight contextual boundary 
judgments are applied when the project is approached as relatively separate from 
the context. Developments on other scales are ignored. Wide boundary judgments 
are made when external dynamics are constantly taken into account. Attempts to 
connect the project with these external dynamics could easily lead to adaptation of 
the initially planned course of action. 
 
3.2 Methodology  
 
In order to examine the relationship between actors’ boundary judgments and their 
relationship with adaptive governance around complex water issues, we conducted an in-
depth case analysis of the decision to change the management of the Haringvliet sluices. 
It comprises an instrumental case study, in which the researcher uses a specific case to 
gain more understanding about a particular phenomenon of interest (Stake 1995). The 
research design of a single in-depth case study does not enable us to develop generalized 
empirical knowledge about achieving adaptive governance, but it does provide a detailed 
understanding of how managers’ boundary judgments could be related to adaptive 
governance. The case has not been selected explicitly as an example of adaptive water 
governance. However, the case is about responding to ecological developments as a result 
of the policy goal to increase estuarine dynamics in the area. We are interested in whether 
and how water managers implement adaptive strategies, and to what extent their 
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boundary judgments relate to these. The case is especially interesting as it already takes 
more than 20 years to change the water management regime. 
Boundary judgments can be reconstructed by ‘observation of observations’ (Pel 
2009: 127). To enhance the internal validity of our research, we used triangulation of 
research methods and resources: in-depth semi-structured interviews, document analysis, 
and observations. At time of writing, we have been following the case for more than two 
years. All relevant written documents were subjected to detailed study, such as policy 
documents, memos, technical reports, and council minutes. Furthermore, we observed 
seven meetings between stakeholders and experts concerning the issue. These occasions 
were used to observe stakeholder interactions and to check our findings derived from the 
interviews and the document analysis. We interviewed 15 key players who are 
representatives of the key stakeholders in the project. These interviews lasted two hours 
on average, and the interview reports were checked and controlled by the respondents. 
We focused on the boundary judgments of the main managing actors in the case, i.e. a 
national governmental agency (i.e. Rijkswaterstaat: RWS), and the regional government 
(the Province), responsible for enabling a change in the water management regime in the 
Haringvliet estuary. We therefore extensively interviewed these two actors (six 
interviews). We asked questions regarding the four types of boundary judgments (1) the 
scope of the issue, the problem to be resolved, and the consequences of possible 
measures, (2) the interaction process with other actors (e.g. the stakeholders involved, in 
what way, and on which occasions), (3) the structuring of the policy process, the 
allocation of responsibilities, and the relationships with other projects, and (4) the 
external developments relating to the project according to the actors, and what these 
meant or should mean for the project according to the respondents. 
 
4 Case description Haringvliet Sluices  
 
The Haringvliet sluices are part of the Dutch Delta Works built in reaction to the storm 
flood of 1953. The sluices were finished in 1970 and closed off the Haringvliet estuary 
from the North Sea. This had major consequences for the surrounding social-ecological 
system. The closing off led to the disappearance of estuarial tides and turned the 
Haringvliet into a freshwater lake. This was especially valuable for safety, agriculture, 
and freshwater supply in the south-west Delta, particularly on the islands of Goeree-
Overflakkee and Voorne Putten. On the other hand, the closing off has led toward “a 
system with generally low natural ecological values [due to] the accumulation of 
contaminated sediments, disappearance of intertidal areas and nursery grounds for fish, 
disturbance of fish migration, and less mixing of river and seawater” (Smit et al. 1997). 
 
------------Insert Figure 1 around here. Caption: Figure 1 South-west Delta Source: 
Google Maps ------------ 
 
In the 1980s, integrated water resource management (IWRM) was introduced in 
Dutch water management (Disco 2002; Mostert 2006). With its adoption, national 
government aimed at “optimal coordination of the wishes of society with regard to the 
functioning and functions of the water systems … by means of an integral consideration 
of (these wishes and) the potential of the systems” (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 
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1985 in Mostert 2006: 20). By the time of its adoption, this IWRM approach had a strong 
ecological emphasis. Disco (2002) speaks of the ecological turn in Dutch water 
management and the ‘ecologization’ of Dutch coastal engineering. In line with this 
changing paradigm on water management, national government started to investigate 
whether it was possible to change the management of the Haringvliet sluices to restore 
estuarine dynamics in the Rhine-Meuse estuary in 1988 (see table 2). As a possible 
opening of the sluices was also considered to be important for the migration of fish as 
salmon and sea trout, this policy was connected to the Rhine Action Program for 
Ecological Rehabilitation, started in 1987 by the International Commission for the 
Protection of the Rhine (Smit et al. 1997). 
After an environmental impact assessment, it was decided to open the sluices also 
during periods of high tides, allowing brackish North Sea water into the Haringvliet 
system. RWS concluded that the most appropriate policy scenario would be to change the 
management regime of the sluices in various steps. The first step was to open the sluices 
slightly (leave them ajar) in 2005. This decision was taken in June 2000 by the minister 
(henceforth: ‘the decision to change the management of the sluices’). In this way, 
learning could take place during implementation about how best to achieve greater 
estuarial dynamics, and the effects for the users and stakeholders could be controlled. 
Although this first step will not improve tidal dynamics, it was considered to be at least 
of direct value for enhancing the migration of fish as part of the Rhine Action Program. 
However, a higher level of salinity has negative consequences for different water system 
users, such as farmers and water companies. Therefore, two important conditions had to 
be met: (1) the salt intrusion should not move any further than a specified line and (2) the 
intakes for water for drinking and agriculture should be relocated before the sluices were 
opened. In this way, the functionality of the freshwater intakes was secured. RWS 
focused on realizing the first condition. In figure 2, the imaginary border with regard to 
the salt intrusion is shown. The Province was given responsibility for realizing the second 
condition. To meet this condition, freshwater canals have been developed (see figure 2). 
 
 
--------------Insert table 2 around here--------------- 
 
 
---------------Insert figure 2 around here. Caption: Figure 2 Project Area (Adapted from 
Province of South-Holland 2010) --------------------- 
 
 
However, during the policy development and implementation of these two conditions, the 
policy program was confronted with dynamics in the actor environment and in the 
physical environment that created pressures on the direction, and the aim of the policy 
program. Ten years after the decision to change the management of the sluices, the policy 
program was provisionally cancelled in 2011 by national government as a result of a 
strong regional lobby. However, because of the international agreements on fish 
migration and possible financial consequences for non-implementation, national 
government eventually decided to proceed with implementation.  
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5 Case analysis:  boundary judgments of managing actors and adaptive governance 
 
In this section, we analyze the boundary judgments of the managing actors: 
Rijkswaterstaat and the Province. We conclude this section with table 3, in which we 
provide an overview of the assessment of boundary judgments in relation to the 
realization or otherwise of adaptive water governance in the Haringvliet sluices case. 
 
5.1 Analysis of the substantive boundary judgments 
 
From the beginning, there was high uncertainty and ambiguity about the consequences of 
changing the management of the sluices. The water system users were critical with regard 
to RWS’ examinations concerning the consequences of the decision. Although the 
ecological effects were extensively examined, the economic effects were not. For 
example, it remained unclear what the economic risks of the decision would be for the 
farmers and drinking water companies. 
 
5.1.1 Rijkswaterstaat 
 
Within Rijkswaterstaat, we observe a strong domination of water, ecology, and nature 
protection. In line with the ecological turn (Disco 2002) and the IWRM approach in 
Dutch water management, the underlying values of nature and ecology have been shaping 
the decision about estuarial restoration. RWS concentrated heavily on water safety and 
water quality. Regarding the necessary compensating measures for freshwater on the 
islands, RWS initially aimed at pipe lines. “Until 2002 we thought pipe lines on the 
islands could be used as compensating measures. […] This meant that it would only have 
been a ‘case of water’ […] A typical Rijkswaterstaat project.” (Interview PM 3). 
Although the effects of the decision for other domains, such as agriculture were 
examined, they were not incorporated in the policy development and implementation. In 
this sense, they did not influence the aim and direction of the policy program. This 
changed in 2003 when it became clear that the project costs were underestimated and 
regional support for the decision was lacking. Therefore, it was decided to connect the 
development of the compensating measures with other domains. “We realized that we 
couldn’t make it by ourselves. We are going to broaden the project. We are going to try 
to realize the compensating measures in broad area zones by which you could combine 
natural development, recreation, and water retention. In this way, you could include 
more financial resources […]. However, it also became far more complex.” (Interview 
PM 3).  
As Rijkswaterstaat initially considered few domains, but later on more domains 
were included, we assess the substantive boundary judgments as moderate (+/-). 
 
5.1.2 Province 
 
In the development of the compensating measures, important criteria for the Province 
were the consequences for spatial planning and the natural environment. When the 
Province started to cooperate with the Goeree-Overflakkee Water Board and when 
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connections were made with the Delta Nature project, water retention and recreation were 
also included. This led to an integral development plan in which these three values were 
important drivers. However, the inclusion of agriculture and economic development was 
avoided, despite initiatives of local stakeholders (i.e. farmers, inhabitants, and 
municipalities) to realize this. The Province had somewhat conflicting goals in this 
respect. Because it was their responsibility to realize Delta Nature, there was little room 
for maneuver according to the Province’s project manager: “Concerning alternatives in 
the area, there is little flexibility. We want to realize new nature. We are not going to 
transform existing nature. This automatically means that you have to sacrifice 
agricultural land” (Interview PM 5). 
In all, the Province had a moderate consideration of domains (+/-), including 
recreation and water retention, but mainly excluding agriculture and local economic 
development.  
 
5.2 Analysis of the participation boundary judgments 
 
To implement the decision, the initiating parties were dependent on a variety of actors. 
For example, the water boards are responsible for water management on the islands, and 
the land is owned by local governments and private users. The relocation of the water 
intake points therefore needed the cooperation of the water boards, the local governments 
on the islands, and private owners. These actors had different interests and perceived the 
decision to change the management of the sluices in different ways. On both islands, 
there was increasing resistance against the relocation projects and, in the end, also against 
the decision to change the management of the sluices.  
 
5.2.1 Rijkswaterstaat 
 
The process organized by RWS in the development of the decision (1990–2000) was 
characterized by a relatively low representation of stakeholders touched by the decision. 
RWS notes about this: “The somewhat small regional stakeholder representation was a 
consequence of the desire to keep the administrative complexity under control” 
(Interview PM 1). One formal representative of each group of regional stakeholders was 
involved (i.e. one dike count for the different water boards and one mayor for the 
different local governments on the islands). The interaction with these representatives 
was mainly characterized by informing and consulting. After the decision, there was 
sporadic interaction between stakeholders and RWS. This interaction was about 
communication with stakeholders concerning the state of affairs. As RWS notes in this 
matter: “After the decision, the communication with the region became less frequent. A 
decision had been taken, so this was not considered necessary anymore.” (Interview PM 
2). 
To sum up: the interaction with regional stakeholders was mainly characterized 
by communication and not co-production. Relatively few stakeholders were actively 
involved. Therefore we assess the participation boundary judgments as tight (-). 
 
5.2.2 Province 
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The policy process with regard to the compensating measures on the two islands was 
characterized by low stakeholder involvement. At Goeree-Overflakkee, there was 
frequent interaction with only one stakeholder (i.e. the water board). The Province mainly 
developed the compensating measures internally and translated them into formal 
procedures that were then communicated to local governments. The local government 
council (Bernisse) rejected the relocation in 2008. The Province responded by using 
procedural steering mechanisms in order to bypass the local government. This resulted in 
further delays, procedural struggles, and juridical conflicts between regional stakeholders 
and the Province. This changed significantly at the end of 2009 when  the Province 
decided to reconsider the plans.  At Voorne Putten, an interaction process with many 
local and regional stakeholders was set up. There were frequent interactions, and the 
process aimed to develop a freshwater route, taking into account the regional stakes as 
much as possible. The location and the form of the freshwater route were developed in 
co-production between the Province and the regional stakeholders. “The group [of 
stakeholders] came together every three weeks till the summer of 2010 [since March]. 
This resulted in a more positive attitude of the regional stakeholders. […] They are 
getting the feeling that they are being listened to seriously and they now really do have 
influence in the planning process.” (Interview PM 6). 
As the involvement of regional stakeholders was initially weak, but changed later 
on as more stakeholders were included in the planning process, we assess the 
participation boundary judgments of the province as moderate (+/-). 
 
5.3 Analysis of the structural boundary judgments 
 
After delegation to the Province of the task of establishing compensatory measures, there 
was increasing ambiguity with regard to which governmental organization was 
responsible for which part of the policy program, and no one was assigned overall 
responsibility for the program (Kuijken 2010). Furthermore, the relocation of the water 
intake points interfered with environmental and spatial development projects in the area. 
For example, on the island of Goeree-Overflakkee, there were provincial nature 
development projects running in the same spatial area as the planned relocations of the 
water intake points. This caused ambiguity regarding the relationship between these 
projects and what they meant for the regional stakeholders.   
 
5.3.1 Rijkswaterstaat 
 
A strong indicator of the structural boundary judgments in the case is the clear 
subdivision of the program into different subprojects and accompanying project 
responsibility. Although the administrative agreement between national government and 
the Province in 2004 stated that the involved governmental actors should cooperate as 
much as possible, both actors mainly acted on their own until 2010. “In that period, we 
were operating at a distance. This was also in line with national policy […]. The […] 
integral execution of the compensating measures is a responsibility of the Province. […] 
The position was that we shouldn’t interfere in the Province’s business. And vice versa, 
from the perspective of the Province: we don’t need any ‘busybodies’.” (Interview PM 
3). In an evaluation of the project, commissioned by national government, it is stated that 
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“the complexity of the implementation is underestimated and has increased during the 
project [implementation]: there is a lack of one party taking responsibility for the overall 
program. […] The activities of the province and RWS are administratively not well 
coordinated and managed” (Kuijken 2010: 8). Since 2010, this has been changing. There 
is now more or less joint responsibility, marked by the involvement of national 
government in the administrative steering group to realize the compensating measures. 
In general, Rijkswaterstaat imposed a very strong division of the project into 
separate parts/subprojects and responsibilities, although this changed in the end. Hence, 
tight boundary judgments are made on this category (-).  
 
5.3.2 Province 
 
The Province focused on the development of the compensating measures on the two 
islands. In the development of the freshwater route on Goeree-Overflakkee, a connection 
was made with another provincial project, Delta Nature, dealing with wetland 
development. Thus, an area development program was set up. This coupling remained at 
project level: it was not addressed in the overall program, although both programs were 
about enhancing the natural transition in the Delta. As one of the project managers of the 
Province illustratively notes: “Delta Nature is a separate project. There is a connection 
at the northern edge of Goeree-Overflakkee, but the two projects are independent of each 
other” (Interview PM 5). Furthermore, inclusion of projects of local stakeholders was 
avoided or not actively managed. A typical quote is the following: “Local governments 
have their own agenda. They wanted to connect their own recreational plan to the area 
designated for the compensating measures. This was a political issue in the local council 
and an important reason for rejecting the relocation. We were sucked into a process that 
we had nothing to do with.” (Interview PM 5). The Province was focused on realizing her 
own project and was rather surprised by these local interferences.  
In all, the Province made a strong division into subprojects and therefore we 
assess the structural boundary judgments as tight (-).  
 
 
5.4 Analysis of the contextual boundary judgments 
 
In order to assess the contextual boundary judgments, we identified three concrete 
external dynamics mentioned by a majority of the respondents as highly important. 
Firstly, there was a growth of blue-green algae in a connected freshwater basin (Volkerak 
Zoommeer) (1). As a solution to this issue, it was planned to increase the level of salinity 
of this water basin. This measure could also affect the level of salinity in the Haringvliet. 
Secondly, increasing attention was paid to the future availability of fresh water in the 
Netherlands, as part of the increasing awareness of the climate change issue (2). A 
national Delta Program was set up, in which freshwater availability was an explicit 
theme. The decision to change the management of the sluices would affect the 
availability of freshwater in the south-west Delta. Thirdly, in cooperation with different 
provincial governments, water boards, and the national government, an integral program 
with regard to the whole south-west Delta was developed in which freshwater, ecological 
resilience, and economic vitality were key themes (3). In this cooperation, decisions were 
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prepared regarding the water governance in the south-west Delta in the near future, but 
also for the long term. Changes in Haringvliet water governance pose consequences for 
this integral policy program and vice versa. 
 
5.4.1 Rijkswaterstaat 
 
Before the decision to change the management of the sluices was made, developments in, 
and consequences for, connected water systems and areas were taken into account by 
RWS. However, once the decision was made, new external dynamics did not influence 
the direction or aim of the policy. This indicates a tight boundary with regard to the 
context. Regarding the developments in the Volkerak Zoommeer, one of the respondents 
notes: “The developments in the Volkerak have no relationship with the decision to 
change the management of the sluices. There is a possible leakage of salt water, but that 
is also the case without the decision to change the management of the sluices.” (Interview 
PM 1). After the decision, management focused solely on technical implementation. 
Connections with emerging policy programs and issues in the environment were not 
made in a mutual way. The project was framed as conditioning for other policies in the 
south-west Delta.  
To sum up: Rijkswaterstaat was not receptive to external dynamics; therefore we 
assess the contextual boundary judgments as tight (-). 
 
5.4.2 Province 
 
The Province also made tight boundary judgments regarding the relationship between the 
program projects that it manages and the context. The policy was that connections with 
other projects (e.g. nature development, recreation) were only allowed if these 
connections would not slow down the process. This was an important reason for not 
making a connection with the integral policy development of the south-west Delta. 
Overall, the Province had a very closed attitude towards external dynamics; 
therefore we assess the contextual boundary judgments as very tight (--). 
 
Table 3 provides a summary and assessment of the boundary judgments made by the two 
managing actors for the four categories. 
 
-------------------Insert Table 3 around here----------------------------------------- 
 
5.5 Boundary judgments and adaptive governance in the case 
 
Our case study reveals that there is little adaptive water governance as mutual learning 
processes between a variety of stakeholders did not take place. The interaction process 
was highly conflictive. Project management was mainly characterized by tight boundary 
judgments. RWS displayed a strong focus on ecological values. Because the Province had 
a strong orientation towards nature development, including with regard to its 
responsibilities in the Delta Nature program, a strong connection between these two 
actors was established. However, these rather tight substantive boundary judgments 
conflicted strongly with the values and interests of regional stakeholders, rooted in 
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agricultural land use and the protection of freshwater availability. This tension was 
increased by tight boundary judgments on participation and structure by the managing 
actors who tried to keep control of the governance process by demarcating the issue, 
clearly dividing responsibilities and restricting the participation of other stakeholders. 
Pressures from the environment of the project increased during the implementation 
process. Non-supportive behavior by important stakeholders, decreasing political support 
for ecological restoration, and cost overruns brought the project to the edge. 
These pressures resulted in an important broadening of the project scope in 2004. 
RWS and the Province decided to realize the compensating measures in broad area zones 
by which more functions could be combined. Connections emerged between the 
Haringvliet sluices project and Delta Nature. More inclusive boundary judgments 
emerged with regard to substance, although the domain of agriculture was not included in 
the planning process, despite stakeholders representing this domain being among the 
fiercest opponents of the project. Furthermore, boundary judgments with regard to 
structure, participation, and context remained relatively tight, and connections with 
regional stakeholders and their agendas were not made. Increasing delays, because of 
procedural struggles between the Province and local stakeholders, resulted in a loose 
coupling between both projects. The broadening of the project scope was declined. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and discussion  
 
In this article, we examined how water managers demarcate complex water issues. This 
approach makes it possible to increase our understanding of why certain governance 
processes prove more adaptive than others. Water managers’ specific boundary 
judgments influence the specific connections in which they invest.  
 Before drawing conclusions from our research, we want to stress several 
important research limitations. We are fully aware that care must be taken in generalizing 
the insights from this case study as it is simply one case in one specific country, i.e. The 
Netherlands. The specific patterns from the case suggest that the relative dominance of 
tight boundary judgments was not supportive to the adaptability of the governance 
process. More empirical research (comparative and quantitative) is needed to provide 
more evidence for this relationship. Secondly, we did not examine the factors or 
conditions which were influencing the construction of these boundary judgments. 
Furthermore, and in relation to this, we did not include (transnational) external factors 
influencing the adaptability of the governance process in the specific and local project of 
Haringvliet sluices. For example, as mentioned in our case description, an important 
factor concerns the international agreements on Ecological Rehabilitation in this respect. 
These international agreements conditioned the project of changing the sluice 
management to a large extent and were an important reason why national government 
decided to continue with the implementation of the decision in 2011 and contributed to 
the tight focus on ecological restoration. Despite these limitations, we believe that our 
analysis provides useful new insights into adaptive water governance.  
  A first insight emerging from the case study is that adaptive water governance 
seems to be conditioned or hampered by tight boundary judgments. Limiting the scope 
for decision-making, the level of participation and focusing upon formal competencies 
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and initial ambitions, conflicts with stimulating or allowing for variety and flexibility. 
Although tight boundary judgments could reduce feelings of uncertainty or provide a 
feeling of control for managing actors, they also make the project vulnerable for growing 
pressures in the project environment, due to conflict and resistance as we have seen in 
this case.  
Boundary judgments regarding substance, participation, structure and context, are 
important aspects to be considered in achieving adaptive water governance in practice. 
These boundary judgments are interrelated and can reinforce each other. In the case we 
observed that actors holding tight boundary judgments around nature development and 
ecology easily find each other, but mainly excluded other stakeholders with other 
interests and values. Tight participation boundary judgments increase the chance of 
fixation on certain solutions or values (see also Termeer and Koppenjan 1997). Tight 
substantive boundary judgments decreases the potential value for other actors to engage 
in water governance processes (tight participation boundary judgments).  
Tight boundary judgments by organizations initiating and facilitating the process 
evoke pressures from the environment of the project which destabilize the existing tight 
boundary judgments and lead to temporarily opening up them. More room is created for 
participation, and new substance (ideas, interests, etc.). A learning process emerges in 
which new connections are made and progress in terms of process is made.  
However, our final conclusion is that (tight) boundary judgments are rather 
persistent. When pressures become less strong and complexity as a result of a more 
adaptive approach becomes apparent and less easily to manage for managers, tight 
boundary judgments get revived and diminish the explorative and learning focus that is 
characteristic for adaptive water governance processes. In this sense, broad boundary 
judgments implies (the need for) connective capacity as the complexity of water issues 
and governance processes is more embraced (Edelenbos et al. 2012). This is however a 
very challenging task as making and maintaining connections require specific managerial 
skills. The literature speaks of boundary spanners: persons who manage the interface 
between organizations and their environment (e.g. Williams 2002). These are individuals 
with specific skills, who are able to operate at the boundaries of different (sub)systems. 
These persons are effective networkers, who understand the social constructions and 
coding schemes of other actors and institutions. Further research is needed to clarify the 
relationship between boundary spanning and the occurrence of (wide) boundary 
judgments. The presence and role of boundary spanners could be an important additional 
aspect to consider in research on adaptive water governance.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Four categories of boundary judgments  
Substantive boundary 
judgments 
Participation boundary 
judgments  
Structural boundary 
judgments 
Contextual boundary 
judgments 
Demarcations 
concerning the content.  
 
 
What is the issue about? 
Which domains and 
values are included? 
Demarcations 
concerning the 
involvement of actors.  
 
Which actors have to be 
involved, in which way 
and on which occasions? 
Demarcations 
concerning the structure 
of the policy process.  
 
Who is responsible for 
which part and how are 
the parts related? 
Demarcations concerning 
the project and its 
environment.  
 
Which external 
developments are 
relevant? 
 
 
Table 2 Overview of policy and decision-making process 
Timeframe Events/marking decisions   
1985-1994 Ecologization of Dutch Water management.  Start of Rhine Action Program. Start of 
examinations to change the management of the sluices by national government 
  
1994-1998 Environmental Impact Assessment   
1998-2000 Decision to change the management of the sluices by national government   
2000-2004 Delegation of part implementation program to the Province. Connection between 
nature development project Goeree-Overflakkee and relocation water intake points 
  
2005-2009 Rejection of the relocation of the water intake points by Local Governments. 
Procedural struggles between the Province and regional stakeholders. 
  
2010-2012 Decision to change the management of the sluices is reconsidered by the national 
government. Due to international agreements on fish migration, implementation of the 
decision is continued 
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Table 3 Boundary judgments of the two main managing actors in the Haringvliet sluices 
case 
Type of 
boundary 
judgment 
Rijkswaterstaat (RWS) Province 
Substantive  The water system mainly judged from 
the domains of water and ecology 
 Later, the domains of water retention 
and recreation are partly  included  
 
 
 
 
Assessment: +/- 
 The freshwater routes mainly 
considered from the domain 
of nature development 
 Later, the domains of water 
retention and recreation are 
partly  included  
 
Assessment: +/- 
Participation  During the preparation of the decision, 
stakeholders are consulted 
 After the decision there is sporadic 
contact between RWS and regional 
stakeholders. Interaction is mainly 
characterized by one-side 
communication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessment: -  
 Until 2009, few stakeholders 
actively involved 
 After 2009 process 
management changed. More 
intensive interaction process 
with diverse regional 
stakeholders to develop the 
freshwater routes. 
 
Assessment: +/- 
Structural   The project is clearly separated into 
different parts. RWS demarcated its 
responsibility around the technical 
preparation of the sluice management. 
Communication with the other 
managing actor (the Province) is weak 
 
Assessment: -  
 Focus on the compensating 
measures; the realization of 
the freshwater routes  
 Later, connections made 
with other provincial 
projects in the region. At the 
end of the process these 
projects are deliberately 
uncoupled 
 
 
Assessment: - 
Contextual  After the decision new developments in 
the field of water governance in the 
surrounding area and climate 
adaptation do not result in any changes 
of the direction or aim of the project 
 
 
Assessment: - 
 The project is considered to 
be a condition for other 
programs in the south-west 
Delta area  
 
 
Assessment: --  
 
 
 
